The Sound and Fury of “We Need More Ships”

TL;DR-The Navy’s force structure is inadequate because its ships are too expensive

This post is a long-form comment on Moore, T.J. (2025). A path to the Navy force structure the nation needs. Proceedings, 151(2), 464. Recently reposted to LinkedIn, the article raises interesting industrial-operations issues using USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) as a case study and argued for spending more to enlarge the fleet (shocker!). This response—too long for LinkedIn or a Proceedings comment—offers alternative interpretations in three parts.

Part I: JFK didn’t “fall apart”; it was deliberately underfunded in favor of higher priorities.

Part II: “Inadequate force structure” is an affordability + appropriation mismatch, not a managerial or willpower failure.

Part III: “We can afford it” is non-argument because we can’t. Understanding why other things have higher priority is the key.

My problem with VADM Moore’s (ret) article isn’t the conclusion—it’s the case study and call for more spending. JFK wasn’t a tragedy of surprise maintenance bills. It was a predictable consequence of designing ships the Navy can’t afford at the quantities leaders claim it needs—and then acting shocked when arithmetic happens. If you want Congress to spend more on your priority, “we can afford it” doesn’t seem to work. Most of the quotes that follow are from VADM Moore’s article.

Part I: JFK was a victim of higher priorities

“On 1 October 1995, the U.S. Navy made the fateful decision to designate the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) as the operational reserve carrier. This allowed the Navy to fund the carrier at 50 percent of her maintenance requirements to save money.”

VADM Moore (a good friend of mine) is entitled to his view, but I don’t subscribe to the “this allowed the Navy” assertion. I served on the Commander Naval Air Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet Ship Materiel (Peggy McCloskey spelling) staff, CNAL-N43), as overhaul planning officer and deputy from 1998-2001 (just before relieving VADM Moore at another command). The maintenance staff responsible for the materiel condition of CV67 did their jobs (of course I would write that, they worked for me!) with half the funding of the operational carriers because there wasn’t *any more money*. Half funding wasn’t a strategy; it was reality.

It was widely known in the CNAL N43 shop that the materiel readiness of the carrier was significantly lower than active fleet carriers. I personally briefed this to our superiors on the Atlantic fleet staff as well as the carrier program office in Washington, D.C. If senior leaders were shocked about the ship’s poor material condition, they weren’t listening. Maybe that’s why admirals prefer slide decks over letters.

The Admiral’s description of moving CV67 to the reserve fleet is incomplete. The motivation behind the move wasn’t merely saving money. It was assigned to the reserve fleet because Navy leaders decided that it was the only way to keep the ship in commission. Congress did not appropriate sufficient funds for its maintenance in the active fleet. I don’t like to personify institutions with phrasing like “Congress did X,” but there are seldom fingerprints on appropriations outcomes. Convenient, isn’t it?

“just prior to a scheduled deployment [in 2001], the John F. Kennedy was found to have two catapults and three aircraft elevators out of service. Feigning shock over the material condition ...”

More accurately: the Board of Inspection and Survey documented numerous “sailor alts” (unauthorized workarounds) on vital systems like catapults and aircraft elevators. They were undocumented (super creative), potentially dangerous, and not authorized by NAVSEA/NAVAIR. Several of these systems weren’t just inoperative, operating them was scary. Some senior Navy leaders may have been shocked, but no senior leader is going to say,”Yes, we knew underfunding maintenance for years was going to lead to this” unless they have a condo in Bermuda to retire to. Otherwise, Navy leaders are really good at feigning.

“the Navy decided the carrier’s upcoming complex overhaul in 2005 was too expensive”

Correct but incomplete. Ralph’s version: the conference report on H.R. 5122 (H. Rept. 109-702) approved “the Navy’s determination” that the cost of maintaining 12 carriers by restoring USS John F. Kennedy would “significantly impact” the Chief of Naval Operations’ plan to build and maintain a 313-ship fleet and agreed to inactivate Kennedy in FY2007 and reduce to 11 (Congressional Research Service, RL32731 updated March 26, 2007). In plain English: they didn’t kill JFK out of surprise or spite; they killed it to protect the rest of the fleet. They still didn’t get funded for the 313-ship fleet. Darn it!

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDRs, remember those?) determined that a naval force including 11 aircraft carriers met the combat capability requirements of the National Military Strategy. The Chief of Naval Operations, in March 2006 testimony before the SASC, emphasized the decision followed a “rigorous evaluation” and that 11 carriers were sufficient for foreseeable contingencies. Who is going to argue with the CNO?

”the Navy surrendered 10 years of an aircraft carrier’s service life”

True, but the situation of the JFK doesn’t meet my definition of surrender, which is giving up fighting because you lack viable options and the commander judges that continued resistance is futile. The CNO and other Navy leaders chose to decommission the ship early because they didn’t receive the Congressional appropriations to keep the ship in service and concluded that they didn’t need 12 carriers (this may be the “resistance is futile” aspect). I wouldn’t call it a truism as much as a personal observation that military leaders don’t get promoted for bucking their chain of command or diss’ing Congress. Rickover was famous for the former, but he never did the latter.

Part II: Inadequate force structure is a bumper sticker, not analysis

“the Navy’s force structure is inadequate because the service has been unable to effectively manage the new construction and ship retirements that determine the size of the force.”

There are two issues here. First, what does “inadequate” mean in this context? While opinions will vary, I think that the clearest way to state it is: the Navy’s stated missions and presence forecasts exceed the fleet it can afford and crew under actual appropriations. As noted above, arithmetic is unforgiving. The force structure analyses approved by Navy leaders don’t consider budgets, which makes them more like wish lists than analyses. VADM Moore used to talk about things like this as “self-licking ice cream cones.” Any list of missions and capabilities divorced from fiscal constraints will always be judged inadequate when it isn’t funded. No surprise there.

Second, “new construction and ship retirements” are dependent variables in this context. They’re outcomes of the missions Navy leaders want their ships to perform, the cost of constructing, manning, equipping, and maintaining those ships, and the money Congress appropriates to do those things. If the force structure Navy leaders want costs more than Congress appropriates or takes too long to build, you can’t build as many ships and you have to retire existing ships. This might be called the immutable law of force structure. Maybe it’s just me, but Navy strategies calling for more ships don’t seem to be a blank check for resources. Go figure.

“the Navy’s force structure has hovered around 285–300 ships for the past 20 years”

True, but the CV67 age at decommissioning and inability to accelerate CVN78 construction don’t seem like the main reasons to this observer. It could be argued that the fundamental reason is that the Navy budget isn’t sufficient to fund new warship designs that Navy leaders approve or to maintain the existing fleet (including personnel).

I agree with VADM Moore’s “immutable laws when it comes to shipbuilding” and suggest he could have added one more: If you don’t get the money you need to build the ships you design, you can’t build as many as you claim you require. This is just as true when your weapons and hulls cost a lot as it is when you start construction before the design is complete hoping to get the funding to “figure it out as you go.” Like that is going to happen. What the Navy seems to practice is “We’ll fix it later when people aren’t looking.”

The Navy’s shipbuilding plan didn’t reduce shipbuilder capacity or the supplier base, its shipbuilding appropriations did. VADM Moore’s Table 1 is less informative in this regard than the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan, submitted more or less annually. Sometimes Navy leaders choose not to submit one even though it is a Congressional requirement. THOSE plans show shipbuilding in accordance with Congressional appropriations for the length of the budget cycle followed by large increases in the ‘out years’—the Navy’s genre of episodic speculative fiction. Hope is not an acquisition strategy except when it is (like hoping for a fleet of 313-381 ships).

“Undoubtedly, the largest challenge [to increasing Navy force structure] is the cost.”

I’m onboard with “undoubtedly,” but you can’t wish away demographic issues in staffing shipyards and the ships they produce. Note, I’m not accusing VADM Moore of doing this, but they are harder problems than most of the “build more ships” crowd acknowledges. Like accelerating construction of a ship, they aren’t easily solved no matter how much money you pay people. This is often wished away by statements that amount to “we’ll work really hard on this.”

Part III: “We can afford it” is a non-argument

“Some will argue the nation cannot afford $40 billion or more per year for shipbuilding and the attendant costs to operate, maintain, and man the ships. But of course the nation can afford it.”

You almost never hear “we can afford it” argued in appropriations terms on the record—because “we can afford it” isn’t a budget position. It isn’t even good marketing if you want increased spending for your priorities (in any organization).

The question that matters isn’t whether the United States has an extra $40B to spend. The important thing is whether the people empowered to allocate federal dollars will treat shipbuilding as a higher priority than the other things that reliably draw money, votes, and allusions to their affects on “the children.” The appropriations record answers that question every year.

Surely the people with the authority to spend more tax dollars know that doubling the Navy’s shipbuilding appropriation is a tiny fraction of what they already spend with great enthusiasm every year. Congress is not institutionally allergic to more spending; it’s allergic to the blowback from your spending priority crowding out someone else’s. They don’t sell pills for that affliction.

Arguments like “it is just a little bit more” or “we did it in WW2” or “the Chinese Navy is really scary” don’t seem to be motivating Congressional appropriators. VADM Moore gave one version of the path that led to the early decommissioning of CV67, which is the same for every warship converted to razor blades “early.” Every year, Navy leaders, often the CNO, go before Congressional committees (overseen by Representatives and Senators with shipbuilders in their districts and states, how does *that* keep happening?) and claim that “the current fleet is ... stretched to the breaking point and ... it is not big enough.” Every year, the committee chairmen agree with the same enthusiastic response you get when you announce “there is an open bar” at a senior citizen rec center (I’ve seen this happen and it’s scary). Yet, every year the Navy’s 30-year plan for the “out years” isn’t funded. This is just the wish-list problem with cool spreadsheets.

“We can afford it” is not a plan. We can afford what becomes a national priority. The appropriations record suggests shipbuilding is far from that. Either the appropriators aren’t reading Proceedings or they have other priorities. It is counter to budget etiquette (and career-limiting) for Navy leaders to argue publicly for tax increases, debt expansion, or cuts to more popular programs in favor of large, floating budget commitments (aka “warships”). Until Congressional appropriators start monitoring LinkedIn more closely (hope springs eternal for some posters), a shipbuilding “plan” that depends on out-year miracles is just Macbeth with spreadsheets—full of sound and fury, signifying unfunded requirements.