HRO 9h What's a Warship Bridge Like?-Internal Focus
This post describes the internal focus the OOD has to maintain as well at the same time he or she is monitoring the external environment.
I abbreviated the reference details to conserve space. Refer to the original post for the complete information.
References
(a) Navy Report of the Collision https://www.doncio.navy.mil/FileHandler.ashx?id=12011.
(b) National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Report of the Collision https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/accidentreports/reports/mar1901.pdf
(c) International Rules of the Road https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/International_Regulations_for_Preventing_Collisions_at_Sea.
(d) U.S. Navy Regulations, Chapter 8, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/US%20Navy%20Regulations/Chapter%208%20-%20The%20Commanding%20Officer.pdf
(e) Standard Organization and Regulations of the U.S. Navy, OPNAVINST 3120.32D CH-1, dtd 15 May 2017, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/Directives/03000%20Naval%20Operations%20and%20Readiness/03-100%20Naval%20Operations%20Support/3120.32D%20W%20CH-1.pdf
I am omitting a summary of the accident that I included with prior posts to keep the length of this post tractable.
Safely guiding a ship through an area where there are lots of other ships is exceedingly complex. The OOD of a U.S. Navy ship is responsible to the CO for “safe navigation and tak[ing] action to avoid the danger of grounding or collision” (ref (e), p.4-17). To effectively execute his or her responsibilities, the OOD must monitor the internal condition of the ship, which requires him or her to:
supervise and receive reports and recommendations from all Bridge watchstanders and remote watch locations (lookouts, Engineering, Damage Control, and the Combat Information Center),
monitor radio communications, and
know the details of any limitations of malfunctioning equipment (radios, radars, engines, rudders, and other systems) placed on the ship’s ability to safely navigate.
The OOD must pay attention to many aspects of own ship’s performance. First, he is the officer in charge of the entire Bridge watch team. He has to monitor orders to and reports from each watchstander and remote watch location. Do the reports make sense? Are they consistent with his understanding of the situation? If not, are they wrong and need to corrected or are they providing information he lacks? Recall that the average age of enlisted watchstanders in the U.S. Navy is about 20. On any given day, many of the watchstanders might be inexperienced because they are standing their first watch. This is especially true when the Sea and Anchor Detail is not set. Erroneous reports happen all the time. When I was the Combat Information Center (CIC) Watch Officer, I was called to the Bridge by the OOD more than once because he thought the reports he was receiving were useless.
Most of the reports by other watchstanders are made directly to the OOD. When experienced, Bridge watchstanders know the priority of their report and whether to wait for another watchstander to complete another report before speaking. If not, many watchstanders speak the same time even if the information they are conveying is routine. Since many reports to the OOD are related to the risks presented by other ships and navigational hazards, the number of reports and speed with which they are given increases greatly in areas of high shipping density. Even when the reports don’t overlap, they can come in rapid succession. The OOD must acknowledge, understand, and prioritize the importance of every one of these reports. This is not so easy to do when the OOD is talking to someone, giving an order, or making a recommendation to the CO. Watchstanders are trained to repeat their reports until they are acknowledged by the OOD.
Second, the OOD must monitor radio communications from other ships and reports made directly to him from supervisory watchstanders in CIC and Engineering. In a TSS, there is constant communication between ships, sometimes in thickly accented English. The OOD must be alert to hails from other ships, but often it is not clear when this is happening since the ship’s name is only on the stern or it might be dark and the hailing vessel might not be able to see it.
I once missed a radio hail from a huge cruise ship that was overtaking me at night in a TSS because the officer on the other bridge referred to us as “little ship.” I didn’t realize until he passed us that WE were the little ship. Supervisory watchstanders in locations remote from the bridge have no way to judge the external environment the OOD is monitoring, but often have the need to pass information to or receive it directly from the OOD. Like reports from watchstanders on the Bridge, some of these communications are important. Each one represents a tax on the OOD’s limited attention resources.
Another time, I tried repeatedly to warn a merchant ship that it was entering a U.S. Navy missile exercise zone and that he needed to change course. I received no answer. The CO came to the bridge and was not happy about the situation. As the saying goes, frustration leads to anger and anger seeks a target-ME. I tried several more times to contact the Bridge of the merchant ship (this time with my CO yelling in the background) and still received no answer as the merchant ship continued to approach the area. There were no other ships in front of us and the risk of collision was low. At this point, the CO gave permission to begin the missile firing exercise. Moments later, the first surface to air missile took flight. A *very* short time later, it was clear that the merchant ship was altering course to avoid the area. Sometimes you can get action from other ships *without* establishing radio communications.
Third, the OOD must be aware of the status and performance of all systems related to maneuvering: rudders, engines, radars, and their associated control systems. In a TSS, the Conning Officer will be constantly adjusting course and speed to maintain position and avoid other ships. Every time this happens, the OOD must temporarily stop making sense of the actions of the other ships to observe the indications for course, speed, and rudder. Are the systems and controls responding correctly? If not, he or she must make a split-second decision to declare an emergency and respond appropriately, which varies depending on the relative motion between other shipping and own ship.
Every decision the Conning Officer makes with regard to the need to maneuver the ship must be made with anticipation. Maneuvering a ship at sea is not like driving a car. The motion of the ship does not change rapidly after rudder and engine orders. First, changing the momentum of an object that displaces 8,261 long tons (8,394 metric tons), is 504.5 feet (153.8 meters) long, and is 66.4 feet (20.2 meters) wide takes time. This means that the physics that applies to ship motion through the ocean (a viscous fluid in technical terms) requires that the officer with “the Conn” (the single person authorized to give rudder and engine orders) be alert for developing situations. The Conning Officer might give the correct order, but too late to avoid disaster. Second, unlike the driver of a car or the pilot of an airplane, the officer with the Conn doesn’t actually control anything. Everything he or she wants done is accomplished by giving an order to another watchstander who repeats the order before acting. Double the delay when the OOD wants the Conning Officer to give a maneuvering order. In theory, the OOD can “take the Conn” by issuing orders directly to the Helmsman, but this is seldom done and creates additional risk of confusion. The delay is increased if the Conning Officer gives the wrong order (to turn port (left) instead of starboard (right)-it happens).
