My second encounter with reference classes and the Planning Fallacy
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Welcome to my website. This is where I write about what interests me. Enjoy your visit!
Welcome to my website. This is where I write about what interests me. Enjoy your visit!
The biggest resistance to a strategy to reduce the impact of the Planning Fallacy is likely to be denial of the selected reference class. This post describes my shield meltdown over references classes.
US weapons system are increasingly late to complete, and exceed projected costs. This post is an introduction to the Planning Fallacy.
The Navy’s schedule and cost estimates for new warships are “accuracy challenged.” This applies to almost all project estimates. This is the first post of a series that seeks to understand why.
This is another post on Navy ship maintenance realities. I restate the fundamentals of Navy ship maintenance (knowing, planning, doing, and testing) and do a deep dive on Class Maintenance Plans.
Navy ship depot maintenance is expensive. The only way to significantly lower repair costs is to do less of it. This isn’t good for long term ship material readiness or budgets. Neither is espousing rubbish about ship repair.
Achieving acceptable performance in Navy ship depot maintenance is hard. Diagnosing the key problems when things aren’t going well is even tougher since so many factors that contribute to delays aren’t under the control of any one Navy activity. Ship lifecycle management poor performance has many components. Depot maintenance is just one of them.
This is another post in my series devoted to ship overhaul. I continue examining Navy ship maintenance through GAO publications by responding to comments and digging deeper into causes of ship maintenance delays.
I examine Navy ship maintenance performance through the lens a GAO statement based on numerous GAO reports. Spoiler alert: after all those reports, things aren’t getting better.
The focus of this post is what can interfere with the support the ship’s crew should provide to the SY in an overhaul.
Providing work and test support in overhaul is challenging for the crew. This post defines good shipyard support.
Overhaul is hard for the crew because of the knowledge gap between ship’s force and shipyard managers about the work and schedule.
This is the first of a series of posts explaining why sailors don’t like ship overhaul. I use the analogy of getting a filling, routine teeth maintenance, as an illustration.
While they can seem like chaos, overhauls have three major parts: setting plant conditions, repairs, and testing the repairs. These parts can be divided even further. Some aspects of overhaul are subtle or fiendishly counterintuitive.
Ship overhaul is hard. It’s even harder when you fall into the trap of fighting against its realities. This is an introduction to my new series on ship overhaul.
While it is adaptive for humans to distort reliability and view events with cognitive biases, it isn’t for HRO. This post discusses reasons why people and organizations avoid accountability, the role accountability plays in HRO, and why it is essential for being highly reliable.
This post and the next focus on the last of the HRO principles that Weick and Sutcliffe missed in their canonical description, accountability. In this post, I discuss what accountability is and the precursors necessary to make it effective.
In this second of two posts on assessment, I argue that assessment contributes to resilience by identifying problems with procedural compliance, records, and performance. I identify the components of HRO assessments. Assessments are a ruthless test of the adequacy of a management system and its design assumptions.
BLUF: Assessment is necessary for learning if a system or process is functioning the way you expect, including its management. Audits evaluate the compliance to procedures, effectiveness of training and qualification, and diligence regarding maintenance of safety-critical systems. In the first of two posts on assessment, I address what it is and why it is necessary for High Reliability Organizing.
BLUF: After cheekily declaring that the canonical five principles of High Reliability Organizing articulated by Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) are insufficient, I assert that three additional principles are essential for HRO. The first of these is training based on rigorous standards for technical knowledge and performance.
