This post is the third and final one exploring my own ideas about Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) High Reliability Organizing principles oriented toward problem anticipation, Preoccupation with Failure. Following this post, I shall return to my shamelessly idiosyncratic review of the collision of the USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore that led to the deaths of 11 US Sailors.

BLUF: This post explores the second High Reliability Organizing principle oriented toward problem anticipation, Reluctance to Simplify. These posts are part of a shamelessly idiosyncratic review of the collision of the USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore that led to 11 US Sailor deaths. The series lets me apply my perspective and experience to illustrate key HRO concepts that might be hard to identify from the investigation reports alone.

BLUF: This post explores the first of three High Reliability Organizing principles oriented toward problem anticipation, Sensitivity to Operations. Subsequent posts will address Reluctance to Simplify and Preoccupation with Failure. It is part of a shamelessly idiosyncratic review of the collision of the USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore. The series uses my perspective and experience to illustrate key HRO concepts that are hard to identify from the investigation reports alone.

BLUF: This post continues using the five principles of High Reliability Organizing (HRO) as a lens for reviewing the collision of the USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore. The series uses my perspective and experience to illustrate key HRO concepts that are hard to identify from the investigation reports.

BLUF: This post is the first of several using HRO to analyze the sequence of events associated with the collision of the USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore. The series uses my perspective to illustrate key HRO concepts that are hard to identify from the investigation reports.

With the review of the sequence of events and supplemental information complete, this post returns to James Reason’s accident causality model to “sort” the facts associated with the collision of the USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore. The series is based on my perspective on HRO to illustrate key concepts that are hard to identify from the investigation reports.

BLUF: This post provides supplemental information from the Navy and NTSB reports that are most helpful for understanding of the context. The additional data includes training, qualification, and technical information about ship control systems related to the collision of the USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore. The series uses my perspective on HRO to illustrate key concepts that are hard to identify from the investigation reports.

BLUF: This post returns to the review of the sequence of events associated with the collision of the USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore. The series uses my perspective on HRO to illustrate key concepts that are hard to identify from the investigation reports.

BLUF: This post returns to the review of the sequence of events associated with the collision of the USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore. The series uses my perspective on HRO to illustrate key concepts that are hard to identify from the investigation reports.

BLUF: This post continues the description of the high workload on the Bridge before the collision of the USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore. The series is devoted explaining key concepts of HRO in context. The prior post emphasized the attention an OOD must devote to the environment external to the ship. This post describes the internal focus the OOD has to maintain as well (post 9g).

BLUF: This is a brief departure from the sequence of events associated with the collision of the USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore. The series is devoted explaining key concepts of HRO in context. This post helps non-Navy Surface Warfare Officers understand the high mental workload on the Bridge before the collision. It emphasizes the attention an OOD must devote to the situational features external to the ship.

This is Part Five of the sequence of events associated with the collision of the USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore. It is part of a series devoted explaining key concepts of HRO in context and continues with the day before the collision.

BLUF: I have received many comments on LinkedIn about my posts thus far (thanks a lot). They raised several good issues that are worthy of discussing in a separate post.

BLUF: This is Part Four of the sequence of events associated with the collision of the USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore. It is part of a series devoted explaining key concepts of HRO in context. This is the second of two posts that uses the sequence of events to examine value conflicts associated with Highly Reliable Organizing.

This is Part Three of the sequence of events associated with the collision of the USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore. It is part of a series devoted explaining key concepts of HRO in context. This is the first of two posts that uses the sequence of events to examine value conflicts associated with Highly Reliable Organizing.

BLUF: This is Part Two of the sequence of events associated with the collision of the USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore. It is part of a series devoted explaining key concepts of HRO in context and continues with the day before the collision.

BLUF: This is Part One of the sequence of events (SOE) associated with the collision of the USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore. There were many things from the SOE that present opportunities to learn so there will be many parts.

The USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) collided with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore. Ten Sailors died, forty-eight more were injured, and both ships were damaged (DDG 56 seriously). This is the first in a series of posts devoted to the application of HRO for analyzing the accident.